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THE STATE OF
PROFESSIONALISM
IN INTERNAL AUDITING
Damages resulting from the crisis in the savings and loan
industry, continuing allegations of independent audit failures
and recent media reports of significant declines in the moral
integrity of new entrants to the managerial job market have
heightened concerns about top management's moral integrity
and commitment to traditional internal control objectives. Many
believe that top management officials in both the private and
public sectors are failing to take adequate measures to install,
maintain, and monitor adequate internal control structures
within their organizations. Other related matters that appear to
be inadequately addressed include the measures that need to be
taken to deter fraudulent acts and unethical conduct.
Recognizing these apparent deficiencies, authoritative bodies such as the Treadway Commission have begun to look to the
internal audit function to provide organizations additional internal assistance in identifying and remedying internal control
deficiencies, curbing fraudulent acts, and monitoring the ethical
conduct of organizational employees. For example, a significant
portion of the recommendations made in the Treadway Commission Report focuses on strengthening the organizational position of the internal audit function in order to improve both its
authority and capability to accomplish these duties.
These recent events have rekindled concern by scholars and
practitioners about professionalism in the field of internal auditSubmitted April 1994
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ing. 1 Much of this interest is driven by the implied presumption
that further enhancements in the professional status of internal
auditing will have a positive influence on the field's capabilities
to address the issus of fraud, deficient controls, and unethical
behavior in commerical and governmental practice.
The professional status of internal auditing is an important
issue. Internal Auditing must possess the status of a "genuine
profession" in order to attain the requisite authority to enforce
its standards on practice. Until this status is attained, commercial compliance with internal auditing standards will be largely
voluntary. A field of work that must rely on voluntary compliance with its standards lacks the "genuine" status possessed by
the well established professions such as medicine, law, architecture, and public accounting.
This study examines, from a historical perspective, the professional progress made by the field of internal auditing since
1977. The overriding objectives of this examination are: (1) to
determine if the field of internal auditing has achieved professional status; (2) to assess whether progress has been made in
enhancing the professional status of internal auditing since
1977; and (3) to suggest any actions disclosed by the analysis
that might be taken by the field of internal auditing in the future
to further enhance its professional status or the prospects
thereof.
This study of professionalism focuses on events and activities that have transpired since 1977 for three major reasons:
First, many authorities believe that the passage of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 marked the beginning of a new
era of improved opportunities for internal auditors. 2 Thus,
events and activities transpiring since 1977 might be expected to
reveal stronger evidence of professional status for internal auditing than events and activities transpiring before 1977. Second,
many internal auditors consider the initial release of the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing by the
Institute of Internal Auditors Inc. in 1978 to be one of the most
important "professional milestones" ever achieved by the field of
internal auditing. 3 Therefore, activities and events transpiring
since 1978 under the support of these new standards should
1

For example see: Rodriquez [1991], Vessel [1991], Thornhill [1990], Miller
[1989], and Westberry [1989].
2
For example, see: Sawyer [ 1991 ], p. 42 or Flesher [ 1991 ], p. 10.
3
For example see: Sawyer [1991], p.39.
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provide better evidence of professional status than activities and
events transpiring prior to the attainment of this notable "milestone". Finally, two previous studies published by Burns and
Haga [1977] and Dierks and Davis [1980] have cast serious
doubt that internal auditing qualified as a profession (in the
strictest sense) prior to 1977. Thus, our decision to commence
our study in 1977 avoids replication of circumstances already
treated by these former studies.
This study reveals that the prospects for professional status
have improved for the field of internal auditing since 1977. Several of the serious roadblocks to professional status noted by
earlier studies have begun to dissipate and have brought about
improved conditions that internal auditors might capitalize on
to enhance their prospects for attaining "genuine" professional
status. Finally, the study suggests several available courses of
action that internal auditors might consider to capitalize on
these improved prospects.
PROFESSIONAL STATUS DEFINED
Definitions of a profession fall within the research realm of
the field of sociology. Over the years, sociologists have developed two different types of behavioral models that have been
used in the accounting arena to explain the distinctive features
of a profession: (1) the "shopping list" model; and (2) the "intimidation" model. Characteristics of both models and the basic
reasons that led us to favor the "intimidation" model are explained in the following two subsections.
The Shopping List Model of Professional

Status

The "shopping list" model is the traditional model of professional status. It has been adopted by most occupations that have
claimed professional status over the years. The "shopping list"
model defines the distinctive features of a profession in terms of
a list of observable "professional" traits or behavioral attributes.
Traits and attributes included on the "shopping list" have been
noted by various sociologists who have studied both professional and non-professional occupations for many years.
Specific professional traits included on a typical "shopping
list" will vary somewhat depending on the sociologist who originally prepared it and the field that subsequently adopted it for
their own use. Nevertheless, a typical list adopted by an occupation claiming professional status will invariably include most
Published by eGrove, 1994
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(i.e., attribute nine is normally omitted since it may prove embarrassing to members, and attribute eight has been declared
"unconstitutional" since the publication of the B&H [1977]
study) attributes included on the comprehensive "shopping list"
compiled by Burns and Haga (B&H) [1977]. This B&H list has
been reproduced here for the reader's convenience as Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
THE TRADITIONAL SHOPPING LIST
OF
PROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTES
(1977 Version)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Professions are occupations that involve altruistic service to the public.
Professions are occupations that require long specialized training for
their entrants.
Professions are occupations that embrace a code of ethics.
Professions form associations and hold meetings.
Professions publish learned journals aimed at upgrading their practice.
Professions use examinations as barriers to entry.
Professions try to limit their practice to members licensed by the state
or certified by association boards.
Professions do not permit advertising of their services.
Professions are occupations in which practitioners wear symbolic costumes (for example, black robes, or white coats) and control access
and the behavior of non-members in their work places (for example,
court rooms, operating rooms or religious sanctuaries).
Note: Attribute 8 can no longer appear on a profession's shopping list
since it has been declared "unconstitutional.
Source: Burns and Haga [1977], p. 707.

Official CPA versions of the "shopping list" have appeared
in various AICPA publications [e.g., Roy and MacNeill (1967)
and Carey (1969)]. CIA and CMA versions of the "shopping list"
continually appear in the membership information packets provided by the IIA and the Institute of Management Accountants
(IMA) respectively. Shopping lists for CIAs and CMAs also appear frequently in many professional journals. 4
4

For a recent example see James P. Westberry Jr., "The Pursuit Of Professionalism," Internal Auditor, (April 1989).
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B&H [1977] cited two major weaknesses in the "shopping
list" model that limit its reliability and utility as a research tool. 5
First, "most versions of the "shopping list" fit most of the pretenders as well as the genuine professions". This deficiency
causes the "shopping list" model to be an unreliable indicator of
"genuine" professional status. Second, "shopping lists" are inadequate guides for designing programs that are aimed at either
converting an occupation into a genuine profession or enhancing the status of an already established profession". Consequently, success of a field in developing itself along the lines of
attributes appearing on a "shopping list" may be an unreliable
indicator of that field's true progress in attaining genuine professional status. These weaknesses caused us to place less reliance on "shopping list" model than on the "intimidation model"
in performing this study. 6
The Intimidation

Model of Professional

Status

The intimidation model is a causal model that describes
why certain occupations enjoy their distinctive status as genuine
professions and why others do not. The essential concept underlying the intimidation model is that the "genuine" professions
maintain autonomy in their work environment by exercising
intimidative power. This capacity to maintain autonomy by exercising intimidative power is the critical visible ingredient that
distinguishes genuine professions from would-be professions
and pretenders. Therefore, occupations that lack authoritative
intimidative power simply do not qualify as "genuine" professions under the intimidation model.
According to B&H, genuine professions draw their intimidative power from the following two interrelated sources:
1. High Cruciality — Clients, employers and other outside groups comprising the relevant work audience
of a profession consider the profession to be absolutely critical to their continuing prosperity, welfare
and/or survival.
5

Burns and Haga [1977], p. 707,
Internal auditing has effectively "qualified" as a profession u n d e r the
"shopping list" model since 1974 the year of its first CIA Exam. As of 1974 it
possessed 7 of the 9 attributes on the list presented in Figure 1. The only attribute not yet attained by internal auditing is attribute 9 which involves a
distinctive costume and controlled access to its work realm. Attribute 6 is, of
course, illegal.
6
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2. High Mystique — Clients, employers and other significant outside groups comprising the relevant
work audience of a profession consider members of
the profession to possess expertise bordering on the
sublime over a work ideology that is baffling but
essential.
In forming these two perceptions, the relevant work audience of the occupation effectively bestow "genuine professional
status" on all members-in-good-standing of the group who are
sanctioned to provide the occupation's services. This bestowing
of status provides the "genuine" profession its intimidative
power and authority.
Occupations involved in a line of work not susceptible to
the cultivation of high mystique and high cruciality will normally face serious impediments to gaining "genuine" professional status. Lacking a basis for the cultivation of these perceptions, these o c c u p a t i o n s will have little h o p e of g a i n i n g
intimidative power. 7
Under the intimidation model an occupation possesses
sufficiently high degrees of mystique and cruciality to qualify as
a genuine profession whenever a preponderance of its members
possess the effective capability to win disputes with their relevant work audience through the application of mild or stronger
forms of intimidative behavior. The u l t i m a t e intimidative
weapon, wielded by genuine professionals, is the threat to withdraw or withhold future services.
The possession of this ultimate weapon operates somewhat
like a "doomsday device" for the "genuine" professions. Clients
or employers baffled by the somewhat mystical advice of a professional practitioner such as a physician or attorney will normally suspend their own judgments and defer to the advice of
the professional. This deference takes place out of fear that further argument might provoke the professional into threatening
withdrawal of further services. If the practitioner is a member of
a "genuine" profession these services will be perceived to be
absolutely essential (i.e., highly crucial) and available from no

7
Occupations seeking or claiming professional status often become involved
with unionization as an alternative means to gain autonomy over their line of
work when their efforts to professionalize have failed to win them professional
intimidative power based on high mystique and cruciality. See Burns and Haga
[1977], p. 707.
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other source (high mystique) than another member of the profession.
K n o w n capability to apply this u l t i m a t e i n t i m i d a t i v e
weapon permits the professions to win most routine disputes
with clients or employers by applying milder and more polite
forms of intimidative behavior in day-to-day practice. CPAs,
physicians, attorneys, and architects all apply intimidative behavior to win minor and serious disputes with clients or employers who refuse or are reluctant to follow their professional advice. For example, CPAs win many minor disputes with less
sophisticated audit clients in day-to-day practice by applying
subtle forms of intimidative behavior such as the frequent use of
technical accounting jargon and recitations of complex quotes
from authoritative accounting standards. Stronger forms of
intimidative behavior such as threats to issue qualified or even
more severe adverse audit opinions are also used in independent
audit practice to win more serious disputes with clients. In the
most serious disputes the ultimate threat to withdraw from the
audit may be used. This ultimate threat to withdraw from the
audit will normally cause all but the most difficult clients to
cease further argument and follow the advice of the independent
auditor. This change in the attitude of the client takes place
because withdrawal of the CPA from the audit for "legitimate
professional reasons" would often bring about serious and potentially "life threatening" implications for the client entity. 8
This life or death power is the essence of "high cruciality" as
these terms are interpreted by the intimidation model.
The study of internal auditing discussed in the remainder of
this article emphasizes the use of the "intimidation model" in
analyzing events and activities relevant to internal auditing's
professional status. As compared to the "shopping list" model,
the "intimidation" model prescribes more rigorous and objective
criteria for separating the "genuine" professions from the
would-be professions and the pretenders. In addition, the high
mystique and high cruciality sources of intimidative power identified by the "intimidation" model provide a better research basis than the professional attributes of the "shopping list" model
for evaluating any changes that have taken place since 1977 in

8

These implications could include the inability to secure independent audit
services from any other CPA and legal actions suspending further trading in its
securities on the organized securities market.
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the professional status of internal auditing. 9 This is the case
because changes that affect the cruciality and/or mystique of
internal auditing should directly influence the intimidative
power of practicing members in the internal auditing field.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROFESSIONAL STATUS
OF INTERNAL AUDITING
Three different historical perspectives were pursued to examine the professional status of the internal auditing field. First,
relevant research dealing with the practice of internal auditing
was reviewed and examined to search for evidence of effective
intimidative power on the part of internal auditors. This review
commenced with the 1977 B&H article. Second, the IIA Standards For The Professional Practice Of Internal Auditing (IIA
Standards) and the current revised IIA Code of Ethics (COE)
were analyzed to identify evidence of provisions sanctioning two
types of behavior: (1) intimidative behavior befitting a "genuine"
profession, or (2) "unprofessional" (e.g., weak or professionally
inappropriate) behavior. This review of IIA Standards and COE
covered related standard setting activities of the IIA since the
initial publication date of the IIA Standards in 1978. Finally,
legal statutes and legislative activities along with the activities of
authoritative regulatory agencies and investigatory groups were
reviewed since 1977. This review was conducted to identify any
current or prospective authoritative sources of support for the
intimidative power of internal auditors.
Results of the Literature

Review

Our literature review did not reveal any convincing evidence
that internal auditing has gained effective professional intimidative power in the preponderance of organizations that
currently maintain an internal audit function. The studies and
research reviewed tend to suggest that many more auditors are
likely to be intimidated by top management than vice versa.

9
For example changes in Federal Laws since 1977 have forced medicine, law
and public accounting to drop their traditional ethical rules prohibiting advertising of their services. Since the mid-1980's these fields have not been permitted to
maintain attribute 8. Failure to maintain this attribute has not had any discernible impact on the professional status of medicine , law or public accounting.
Even without attribute 8 these fields continue to qualify as "genuine" professions if any fields so qualify.
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Therefore, there appears to be continuing reason to doubt that
internal auditing qualifies as a "genuine" profession under the
tough criterion imposed by the "intimidation" model.
B&H [1977] applied the intimidation model to examine the
professional status of CPAs, management accountants, and internal auditors near the close of the decade of the 1970s. They
determined that as of 1977 the cumulative efforts of the IIA had
been unsuccessful in attaining genuine professional status for
the field of internal auditing, because their members lacked effective intimidative power in practice. As of 1977, membership
in the IIA and/or possession of a valid CIA credential did not
provide internal audit staff members and/or the director of internal audit the effective capacity to control the autonomy of the
internal audit function in most organizations. In the late 1970s
top management officials could constrain the organizational activities open to internal audit or stonewall sensitive findings discovered by its internal auditors. Management could effectively
respond to the internal auditing function's threats of resignation, withdrawal or suspension of further services by simply
replacing its professional internal audit staff with more cooperative employees who were neither CIAs nor members of the IIA.
The fact that management considered members of the laity as
alternative sources of internal audit services indicated that internal auditing lacked sufficient cruciality and mystique in the eyes
of high echelon management to maintain its professional autonomy in most organizations. Consequently, B&H concluded
that internal auditing failed to qualify as a "genuine" profession
as of 1977.
In 1980, Dierks and Davis (D&D) [1980] applied the
intimidation model to re-examine the conditions of cruciality
and mystique in internal audit practice. They were motivated to
re-examine this issue because of the enactment of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 (FCPA 1977), and the issuance of
IIA standards in 1978. Both of these events provided internal
auditors an opportunity to assume a more crucial role in monitoring, testing, evaluating and reporting on their organizations'
internal controls. The IIA standards also appeared to provide IIA
members and CIAs an improved basis for gaining enhanced
mystique and cruciality.
D&D had internal auditors complete a survey instrument to
m e a s u r e their perceptions of how m a n a g e m e n t and others
viewed their (i.e., the internal auditor's) cruciality and mystique.
Cruciality and mystique were assessed in eight different areas
Published by eGrove, 1994
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covered by the then relatively new IIA Standards. Measurements
of mystique and cruciality were separately captured for each
area on a five point Likert scale ( 1 indicating high and 5 indicating low). Overall averages for mystique and cruciality were
generally below the midpoint of the scale. The final overall conclusions reached by D&D were that internal auditing had not yet
achieved genuine professional status, but that this status was
now within internal auditing's grasp.
Unfortunately, D&D's conclusions are open to serious questions, because they did not address their survey directly to members of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees or other key organizational insiders that comprised the
relevant work audience of the internal audit function. In addition, D&D did not ask the internal auditors whether or not they
possessed the capability to control the autonomy of the internal
audit function in their employing organization through intimidation. How members of an occupation view their own mystique and cruciality matters little if their work audience fails to
share the same view.10 Thus, there is reason to doubt that the
actual professional status of internal auditors in 1980 was any
different than it was in 1977 when the B&H study took place.
The results of the Mautz, Tiessen, and Colson (M,T&C)
[1984] study provided some evidence of insufficiency in the perception of cruciality enjoyed by internal auditors in top US companies during the early 1980s. Management officials responding
in the study listed "inadequate appreciation by this company of
internal audit capabilities" as the number one factor inhibiting
the usefulness of the internal audit function in their organization. Members of the audit committees of the same companies
participating in the M,T& C study listed "inadequate appreciation of internal auditing capabilities" as the number two factor
inhibiting the usefulness of the internal audit function in their
companies. This strong feeling of "inadequate appreciation"
does not indicate that the internal audit functions enjoyed a
perception of high cruciality in their respective organizations.
Unfortunately, M,T&C study did not address the issue of the
professional intimidative power possessed by the internal audit
functions of the companies which participated in their study.
The study did indicate that a significant portion (72%) of the
participating audit committee members shared the perception
that internal auditors were among the best technically qualified
10

See Burns and Haga [1977], p. 708.
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employees in their organizations. Unfortunately, technical competence is only one of many factors that determines the perception of mystique enjoyed by a profession. 11 Consequently, evidence resulting from the M,T&C study cannot be used to assess
the perception of mystique enjoyed by the internal audit functions that participated in the study.
Research published subsequent to the D&D and M,T&C
studies, dealing with mystique, cruciality or the intimidative
power of internal auditors, continued to indicate symptoms of
insufficient intimidative power on the part of internal auditors
into the late 1980s. The lack of intimidative power demonstrated
by management's ability to dismiss an "uncooperative" internal
auditor was reported by Wells [1985] as a continuing concern
among practicing internal auditors in the 1985 era.
Studies dealing with the internal audit reporting of sensitive
issues and "whistle blowing" provide further evidence of insufficiency in the intimidative power of internal auditors during the
decade of the 1980's. For example, in a study dealing with internal audit reporting of sensitive issues, Near and Miceli [1988]
(N&M) noted "fear of retaliatory action by management" as a
legitimate concern shared by a significant n u m b e r of directors
of internal audit. The N&M study further indicated that a significant n u m b e r of internal auditors participating in their study
considered "possible retaliatory action by management" as a relevant decision factor in their deliberations involving decisions
on whether to pursue or not pursue formal audit reporting of
sensitive findings.
Case studies on "whistle blowing" such as those published
by Suchodolski [1981], Wells [1985], and Vinten [1992] illustrate
instances in practice where sensitive issues discovered in internal audits were either blocked from the formal audit report or
otherwise "stonewalled" by higher level management officials of
notable organizations. Some of these "whistle blowing" cases
involved instances where well-intentioned internal auditors attempting to comply with IIA standards were fired and/or seriously punished by management officials of their employing organizations. These whistle blowing cases illustrate instances in
practice during the 1980s where the intimidative power of the
internal auditor was insufficient to overcome management. Dishonest managers in these "whistle blowing" cases did not defer
to the judgments of their internal auditors and forced the inter11

For an expanded discussion of mystique, see B&H [1977] p.710.
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nal auditors to move beyond the intimidative behavior sanctioned by the internal auditing field to effectively commit career
suicide by "blowing the whistle".
Verschoor [1989] noted significant evidence of weak audit
committee support for the internal audit functions in the defense industry in the late 1980s. Evidence of two major factors
which continued to impair the intimidative power of internal
auditing (restrictions placed on the scope of internal audits by
top management; and weak support of the internal audit function by audit committees) was also noted in a study conducted
by Tiessen and Barrett [1989]. Johns [1991] reported some evidence of a minor increase in higher level management support
for the internal audit function in the public utilities industry for
the decade of the 1980s. Johns' report was based on 1980 and
1989 surveys conducted by the American Gas Association and
Edision Electric Institute, respectively.
Research published in the 1990s continues to provide no
clear evidence that internal auditing has gained sufficient
intimidative power to qualify it as a "genuine" profession under
the intimidation model. The lack of sufficient intimidative
power by internal auditors was pointed out by Vessel [1991]
with the claim that "instead of being able to intimidate management, internal auditors are more likely to be intimidated by
management". Evidence of continuing weak support of the internal audit function by audit committees was reported by Peacock and Pelfrey [1991]. Further evidence indicating insufficient
intimidative power of the internal audit function was recently
reported by Kalbers [1992] who surveyed the directors of internal audit and audit committee members of a random sample of
90 US companies. His sample was drawn from Value Line Investment Survey. Directors of internal audit responding to
Kalbers' survey indicated a perception that the top management
officials in their companies "did not encourage" the submission
of internal audit reports to their audit committees that contained findings dealing with such matters as: weaknesses in the
companies' internal control structures; accounting errors; or irregularities. Responses and remarks by the internal audit directors participating in the Kalbers study also indicated that a significant number of internal auditor directors fear retaliatory
action by top management. This later finding tends to agree
with Vessels [1991] earlier report that a significant n u m b e r of
internal auditors continue in the 1990s to be more intimidated
by management than vice versa.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss2/4
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In general, the review of relevant research did not disclose
convincing evidence that internal auditors currently possess sufficient intimidative power to place them on par with the well
established "genuine" professions such as medicine, law, and
public accounting. Most organizations can still replace their internal audit director (or any other internal audit staff member)
with a member of the laity who is willing to subordinate internal
auditing's interests to those held by senior management.
Results of the Historical Review of IIA Pronouncements
Our review of IIA promulgations disclosed a n u m b e r of different provisions sanctioning the application of internal audit
measures that might be perceived by management as mild, mode r a t e o r s t r o n g f o r m s of i n t i m i d a t i v e b e h a v i o r . T h e s e
intimidative measures appeared to focus primarily on three basic issues treated in this section: (1) internal auditor involvement with circumstances involving illegal or improper business
activities or discreditable actions; (2) management reluctance or
refusal to follow internal audit advice; and (3) management imposed internal audit scope restrictions. These issues are most
pertinent to our analysis of internal auditing's professional status because they relate directly to the two major benefits enjoyed by all "genuine" professions: (1) the authority to make
final judgments pertaining to the profession's line of work, and
(2) protection of the profession's autonomy over its work ideology.12
Issue 1: Circumstances involving illegal or improper
activities and discreditable actions

business

IIA Standards prescribe the use of the "ultimate intimidative weapon" under two circumstances. These circumstances
are covered by Rules II and III of the IIA COE respectively. 13
These rules state as follow:
Rule II
Members and CIAs shall exhibit loyalty in all matters
pertaining to the affairs of their organization or to whoever they may be rendering a service. However, Mem12
See Burns and Haga [1977], p. 708. For a more extended discussion see
Friedrich [1958], pp. 25-48, and; Hughes [1963].
13
Standard 240 of the IIA Standards requires compliance with the IIA COE.
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bers and CIAs shall not knowingly be a party to any
illegal or improper business activity.
Rule III
Members and CIAs shall not knowingly engage in activities which are discreditable to the profession of internal auditing or their organization.

Circumstances covered by these rules might arise in conjunction with a new offer of employment or in conjunction with
an ongoing internal audit employment situation. In "employment offer situations", Rule II implies that an internal auditor
should refuse an offer of employment from an organization that
is known by him / her to be actively involved in illegal or otherwise improper business activity. Rule III also implies that an
internal auditor should refuse an offer of employment from an
organization that obviously intends to place him/her under duress to perform discreditable acts. 14
In "on-going employment" cases, Rule II implies that an
internal auditor should resign employment with an organization
that refuses to follow his / her advice (or the advice of others) to
refrain from illegal or otherwise improper business activity.
Rule II might also call for resignation where top management
and the board fail to take appropriate action to follow up on
illegal acts reported to them by the internal auditor in accordance with Guideline 280.06 of the original IIA Standards. This
guideline compels the internal auditor to notify "appropriate
authorities" in the organization whenever he/she suspects instances of "wrongdoing". 15 Similarly, Rule III implies that an
internal auditor should resign employment with an organization
that places him/her under strong duress to perform duties that
constitute discreditable acts.
Both of these rules have been devised to operate as strong
deterrents to illegal or improper business activities in practice.
14
Actions violating provisions of the IIA COE and activities violating the
organization's ethical conduct code would "qualify" as discreditable acts.
15
Guideline 280.06 and IIA Professional Standards Bulletin 83-5 further
stipulate that the internal auditor should discuss all instances of suspected
wrongdoing with appropriate organization officials and recommend any further
internal audit or management investigatory procedures that appear to be warranted in the circumstances. These promulgations further stipulate that the internal auditor should take further follow-up steps to determine that internal
auditing's responsibilities with respect to the circumstances reported have been
met.
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They effectively block organizations sincerely desiring to maintain (or legally required to maintain) a professional internal audit function from engaging in illegal or improper business activities. Well recognized professions such as medicine, law and
public accounting have enacted similar rules to accomplish essentially the same deterrent functions. Thus, internal auditing's
prescribed intimidative measures for "Issue 1" appear to compare favorably with those prescribed by the "genuine" professions.
Issue 2: Management refusal to follow internal audit advice
IIA promulgations appear to focus their second-most severe
forms of intimidative behavior on the issue of top management's
refusals to accept the auditor's formal conclusions or follow the
internal auditor's "formal advice". Here IIA promulgations do
not prescribe the use of "ultimate professional weapons" unless
the audit issues at hand "qualify" as Rule II or Rule III circumstances under the IIA COE.
For audit issues falling outside the scope of Rules II and III,
IIA Standards recommend a variety of intimidative measures.
These measures have gradually evolved over time since the original issuance of the IIA Standards in 1978. The evolution of these
measures reflects a progressive increase in the intimidative pressure applied on higher levels of management to follow the internal auditor's advice.
Intimidative measures recommended by the original IIA
Standards include three that continue to be particularly pertinent to the issue of management resistance to the internal
auditor's advice. First, audit reporting measures recommended
by Guideline 430.06 effectively place significant intimidative
pressure on local auditee m a n a g e m e n t to concur with the
auditor's findings and advice. Guideline 430.06 requires management to explain the detailed basis of all significant disagreements it has with the auditor's findings or advice. These explanations are included (along with other management comments)
in the final audit report. Therefore, managers desiring to contest
the auditor's findings (or desiring to ignore or otherwise depart
from the auditor's advice) find it necessary to develop a rationale for their argument superior to that prepared by the internal
auditor for his/her advice. This management rationale must be
sufficiently convincing to pass review by higher level management and the board. Rejection of lower management's rationale
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by higher echelon officials may jeopardize lower level management's job security. The prospects of such a rejection should add
intimidative power to Guideline 430.06's provisions. This is especially true where auditee management's motives for resisting
the auditor's advice are truly inappropriate (e.g., to avoid open
e m b a r r a s s m e n t or additional work commitments to resolve
problems noted by the auditor).
The second intimidative measure r e c o m m e n d e d by the
original IIA Standards involves follow-up audits. Standard 400
prescribes follow-up audits to exert intimidative pressure on
management to fulfill its promises and take prompt and effective action to implement the internal auditor's formal advice.
Finally, Guideline 440.01 imposes direct intimidatve pressure on
senior level management in the event that it ultimately decides
to back auditee level management's rationale for disagreeing
with the auditor's findings or advice. In these cases, Guideline
440.01 directs the internal auditor to determine that "management and the board has assumed the risk of not taking corrective action on reported findings". The requirement to provide
this "risk acknowledgment" to the auditor should intimidate senior level management and cause them to reconsider their decision to back lower level management's rationale. This is the case
because a "risk acknowledgment" could later be used to weaken
senior management's line of defense in the event that severe
problems actually materialized as a result of their deliberate
failure to follow the internal auditor's advice.
IIA promulgations of 1983 recommended at least three additional intimidative measures to strengthen internal auditors'
arsenal for combating management resistance to their advice.
First, Guideline 430.04.1 of Statement on Internal Auditing
Standards (SIAS) No. 2 sanctioned the practice of including a
section in current audit reports presenting an updated status
report on actions taken by management to comply with the auditors' advice presented in previous reports. Use of these status
reports provides internal auditors an additional formal reporting measure to maintain intimidative pressure on management
to comply with their advice. Second, Guideline 430.06.1 of SIAS
No. 2 prescribed more rigorous formal audit report documentation for audit findings. This documentation included an internal
audit analysis of the actual or potential organizational risks associated with each audit finding. The necessity to discredit these
risk analyses should reinforce the intimidative power of Guideline 430.06's previous recommendations for audit report docuhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss2/4
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mentation of management's rationale for disagreeing with the
auditor's advice. Finally, three additional 1983 IIA promulgations significantly enhanced the intimidative pressure placed on
higher echelon officials by Guideline 440.01 of the original IIA
Standards. IIA Professional Standards Bulletin 83-17 (PSB 8317) specifically stipulated that the internal auditor should pursue lower management disagreements with internal audit advice
to the senior management and board level. This pursuance had
only been implied by Guideline 440.01. PSB 83-17 further clarified that the auditor should formally inform senior management
and the board of the organization risks associated with failure
to follow the auditor's advice. Here former Guideline 440.01 had
not specified formal notification in writing and had not explicitly mentioned that this notification should include the auditor's
analysis of risks associated with matters in dispute.
SIAS No. 7 (1989) further enhanced the intimidative pressures focused on senior management and board members by
requiring that senior management and board level "risk acknowledgments" be formally documented in an executive level
management version of the audit report. This increased the vulnerability of these "risk acknowledgments" to detection by legal
authorities and the organization's external auditor.
At the present time, these, senior management and board
level "risk acknowledgments" are the most powerful intimidative
weapons sanctioned by IIA promulgations to combat management reluctance to follow the internal auditors's advice. IIA promulgations do not explicitly recommend further application of
the "ultimate weapon" where the audit committee or board tacitly or explicitly support senior management's decisions to ignore or depart from the internal auditor's advice pertaining to
matters falling outside the scope of Rules II and III of the IIA
COE.
Measures suggested by IIA promulgations to combat management resistance reflect some possible symptoms of "unprofessional behavior" from the standpoint of the intimidation
model. It may be argued, for example, that IIA Standards providing management an opportunity to openly argue with the
auditor's advice in the formal audit report constitute a weak or
"unprofessional response" to management's challenge of the
professional practitioner's j u d g m e n t s . P r a c t i t i o n e r s of the
"genuine" professions such as medicine and law normally react
to such challenges by simply suggesting that the challenger (i.e.,
client or employer) might obtain a second opinion from another
Published by eGrove, 1994
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"qualified" professional practitioner. Hence the standards of
medicine, canons of law, and AICPA Professional Standards
contrast quite dramatically with IIA promulgations on this issue. The standards of these three genuine professions effectively
p r o h i b i t a r g u m e n t s w i t h clients on issues involving t h e
practitioner's judgments about the profession's work ideology.
Under the intimidation model a profession's judgments are final! 16
Issue 3: Management imposed internal audit scope

restrictions

IIA pronouncements also prescribe strong intimidative measures to avert inappropriate scope restrictions by management.
Two of the strongest measures prescribed for this issue include:
(1) the use of formal internal audit charters; and (2) the formal
reporting of scope restrictions imposed by management to the
board.
The original IIA Standards, issued in 1978, prescribed the
use of formal internal audit charters. Subsequent pronouncements of the IIA have reinforced the effectiveness of these original charter provisions by clarifying many of the detailed matters
that should be covered by a properly prepared charter. These
detailed matters include considerations pertaining to the organizational position of the internal audit function, internal audit
access to information, measures that need to be taken to assure
the objectivity of internal audit staff members , and the scope of
the responsibilities and duties of the internal audit. As a result,
charters prepared in accordance with current IIA Standards
should provide the internal audit function strong intimidative
"contractual" support for resisting inappropriate attempts by
management to bar internal audit access to a sensitive area or
otherwise restrict the scope of an ongoing or scheduled internal
audit. Most violations of a properly prepared charter will require review and approval by senior management and the audit
committee or board in larger organizations.
SIAS No. 7 (1989) recommends explicit formal reporting
measures for management imposed scope restrictions. For significant restrictions, these measures involve formal appeal to senior level management for a rescission of the scope restriction.
If the senior management appeal fails, SIAS No. 7 prescribes
immediate written notification of the board.
16

See Burns and Haga p. 709.
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Where the restrictions imposed by senior management and
the board clearly appear to be motivated by an attempt to conceal illegal or improper business activities, IIA Standard 220
would appear to apply. This standard would invoke Rule II of
the IIA COE which might require the auditor(s) involved to consider a threat of resignation. However, existing IIA promulgations do not appear to call for intimidative action stronger than
written board notification where scope restrictions violating
charter provisions are imposed for less serious inappropriate
motives (e.g., to avert "untimely" audit disclosure of circumstances falling outside the scope of Rule II that would embrass
management or possibly jeopardize their job security). Failure
of the IIA Standards to address this latter category of scope
restriction motives with stronger intimidative measures, effectively sanctions the continuance of substandard internal auditing services from the standpoint of the organization's charter.
This type of circumstance is prohibited by standards that regulate most of the genuine professions. For example, standards in
the field of medicine would require a company-employed physician to resign his or her post if the employer attempted to prohibit him/her from providing medical services to specific employees and those services were g u a r a n t e e d u n d e r the
employees' job contracts.
The true intimidative power of the measures treated in this
section ultimatly depend on management's perceptions of the
internal auditor's cruciality and mystique. If these perceptions
are "high", the IIA measures covered should carry intimidative
power. On the other hand, if these perceptions are insufficient,
the measures covered may represent little more than a nuisance
to management. The studies and articles covered in our previous
literature review tend to cast some serious doubts on the
strength of these management perceptions. Consequently, it appears that, as of this time, the measures covered in this section
carry at least some intimidative power with the management
officials of some organizations but may well represent a nuisance to the managers of others. This leads us to suspect that
internal auditing currently scores higher on cruciality than it
does on mystique. 17

17
Internal auditing must possess some cruciality in the eyes of management.
Otherwise they would not tolerate its nuisance behavior.
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Results of the Historical Review of Activities of Authoritative
or Regulatory Agencies/Groups

and/

Our review of the activities of authoritative groups and
regulatory agencies disclosed several positive signs for internal
auditing's professional prospects. Some of these signs relate to
improved prospects for gaining enhanced cruciality and others
relate to improved prospects for gaining enhanced mystique.
Mounting public concerns for improved internal control
conditions in business and government since 1977 have improved the legal and regulatory agency support prospects for
any field of work that is truly equipped to render effective assistance in the area of internal control. Internal auditors occupy an
ideal organization position to render this assistance and legislators and regulatory groups seem to have become increasingly
aware of this since 1977. Much of this increased awareness appears to have resulted due to the organized efforts of the IIA.18
Since 1977 internal auditors have scored several victories in
winning legislative recognition and support for IIA Standards
and the internal audit function in general. These victories include specific recognition and support in the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA 1977) and the Federal Manager's
Accountability Act of 1981 (FMAA 1981).
The FCPA 1977 and the FMAA 1981 have improved internal
auditors' prospects for gaining enhanced cruciality. Both of
these acts imposed legal responsibilities and serious penalties
directly on senior management officials for installing, maintaining and monitoring adequate internal controls. As Flesher
[1991] points out, these new legal responsibilities and penalties
heightened most top managers' concerns for internal control.
These heightened concerns have motivated many management
officials to increase organizational requirements for internal
control system monitoring, testing and evaluation services including the formal documentation thereof. Evidence of this gain
in cruciality has been reported by Flesher [1991] who stated that
the result of the FCPA 1977 was "the hiring of more internal
auditors by corporations with internal audit departments, and
the establishment of new internal audit departments by those
organizations that did not already have them". 19

18
19

For an in-depth review of these IIA efforts see Flesher [1991].
See Flesher [1991], p. 10.
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Since the enactment of the FCPA 1977, the SEC has instituted more than 174 injunctive actions and more than 31 administrative proceedings under the act's accounting and internal
control provisions. Many of these enforcement actions have resulted in the issuance of injunctive orders directing companies
to strengthen their audit committees and internal audit functions. 20 Directives of this type tend to indicate that the SEC and
the U.S. Justice Department recognize the internal audit function and consider it to be an important force for combating
corporate fraud, internal control problems, and financial reporting deficiencies. This formal recognition is a strong signal that,
the SEC and the U.S. Justice Department may be joining the
relevant work audience of internal auditing. This improves the
prospects for further legislation and regulations that may bolster the cruciality of internal auditing.
Fargason [1993] reports evidence that the U.S. Courts may
also be developing a perception that internal auditing is a valuable professional service. Fargason states that in the past decade, the number of U.S. court cases involving internal auditors
as witnesses has increased dramatically. He further points out
that the courts are increasingly considering the internal audit
function to be a reliable source of valuable evidential information. Recent legal cases cited by Fargason illustrate instances
where higher courts have reversed the judgments of lower
courts on the basis of documentary evidence prepared by internal auditors. He also points out that the U.S. Congress and
many state legislatures have been increasing their reliance on
internal audit reports in drafting new legislation.
The Treadway Commission Report of 1987 represents another important victory for internal auditing from the standpoint of improving its prospects for gaining enhanced cruciality
in public companies. At least six of the recommendations contained in the commission's final report reinforce the application
of corporate control measures that affect internal auditing. Corporate compliance with these recommendations can be expected
to offer internal auditors in public companies improved prospects for gaining enhanced cruciality.
First, and perhaps most important of all, the Treadway
Commission Report explicitly recommended that all public corporations should maintain an internal audit function. This first
20

For example see SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-6123 involving
The Telex Corporation.
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recommendation effectively mandates the existence of a viable
internal audit function in all public companies. This mandate
clearly conveys a message that the members of the Treadway
Commission consider the internal audit function as crucial. It
also sends privately held companies desiring to become publicly
held a strong signal that they should install an effective internal
audit function.
The Treadway Commission Report stipulated that public
corporations should maintain a standing audit committee comprised of nonmanagement directors to coordinate internal and
external audit activities. Compliance with this second recommendation effectively forces senior mangement to consider its
support of the internal audit function to be a more crucial concern. This is the case because unsatisfactory support of the internal audit function by senior level management may be comm u n i c a t e d directly to n o n m a n a g e m e n t d i r e c t o r s of t h e
company by the internal audit function.
The final Treadway Commission Report encouraged the use
of formal internal audit charters by public companies. This
third recommendation relevant to internal auditing provided additional authoritative support for one of internal auditing's
strongest intimidative measures for combating unjustified audit
scope restrictions by management. Treadway Commission support for charters makes it increasingly difficult for management
to resist the internal auditor's requests for formal internal audit
charters in public companies. Charters effectively enhance the
cruciality of the internal audit function by means of their detailed contractual provisions.
The Treadway Commission also encouraged the use of ethical conduct codes by public companies. This fourth recommendation provides internal auditing new prospects for expanding
its services in public companies. The internal audit function
would seem to be the most logical organizational candidate for
monitoring employee compliance with the provisions of the
organization's ethical conduct code. Added responsibilities in
this area enhance internal auditing's prospects for gaining enhanced mystique and cruciality.
The Treadway Commission Report recommended the inclusion of "management responsibility letters" in the annual reports of public companies. These letters require members of
senior management to formally acknowledge that they have met
their primary responsibilities under the FCPA 1977 for installing, maintaining and monitoring adequate internal controls in
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss2/4
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the company. These formal declarations increase the importance of the internal audit work performed to support top
management's representations. For example, significant deficiencies in internal controls reported to top management by the
internal auditor might h a m p e r top management's ability to
claim that it has met its responsibilities under the FCPA 1977.
Therefore, this fifth recommendation of the Treadway Commission offers internal auditing additional prospects for gaining
cruciality in the eyes of management.
The Treadway Commission also recommended the inclusion of an "audit committee letter" in the annual report of
public companies. This sixth recommendation offers internal
auditors stronger prospects for gaining cruciality than the "management responsibility letter". This is so because the "audit
committee letter" would require the chairperson of the audit
committee to comment on matters pertaining to the scope of
audit activities as well as any significant audit findings.
The Internal Control-Integrated Framework project performed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) provides internal auditors additional outside authoritative support that should serve to improve
its prospects for gaining mystique and cruciality in public corporations. The final COSO report issued in 1992 clarified the
importance of the internal audit function as an objective inhouse evaluator of the organization's internal control structures.
The COSO report further recommended the adoption of IIA
Standards and also strongly supported the Treadway Commission's previous recommendation for the inclusion of "management responsibility letters" in the annual reports of public
companies. These COSO report recommendations have improved the prospects for future federal legislation requiring
"management responsibility letters" as well as compliance with
other recommendations of the Treadway Commission covered
previously. 21
The passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1991
(FDIC [1991]) may improve internal auditors' prospects for
gaining cruciality in the banking industry. The FDIC [1991] includes provisions mandating internal control reporting by management and independent auditors for all but small insured depository institutions. Management compliance with the internal
21

See Gujarathi and Raghundan [1993] for additional details pertaining to
the status of the TCR and COSO report.
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control provisions of this new law should enhance the cruciality
of internal audit support in many banking institutions. According to Gujarathi and Raghundan [1993], the success of the internal control reporting provisions of the FDIC law could have
future implications for all public companies.
Other legislative victories scored by internal auditing since
1977 include the adoption of IIA Standards by five states. In
1982, California became the first state in the U.S. to pass a law
that required all state and local governmental internal auditors
to comply with the IIA Standards. Since 1982, at least four other
states ( i.e., Tennessee (1984), Virginia (1985), Florida (1986)
and Texas (1987)) have enacted legislation similar to that enacted by California. Flesher [1991] also reports that several
other states have enacted similar ordinances. 22 State laws requiring compliance with IIA Standards, have enhanced internal
auditing's prospects for gaining both enhanced cruciality and
mystique at the state and local levels of the public sector.
Changes in the AICPA standards pertaining to the independent auditor's consideration of the internal audit function appear to pose mixed implications for the professional prospects
of internal auditing. On the positive side, several new provisions
of SAS No. 65 can be interpreted as effectively alleviating much
of t h e CPA/internal a u d i t o r s k i l l - s u b o r d i n a t i o n p r o b l e m
previously noted by B&H in their 1977 analysis. 23 Unlike its
predecessor pronouncement (SAS No. 9), SAS No. 65 explicitly
recognizes the field of internal auditing as a profession separate
from independent auditing. For example, SAS No. 65 explicitly
acknowledges the IIA standards as appropriate standards for
conducting internal audit activities and evaluating the quality of
the performance of the internal audit function. 24 SAS No. 65
also explicitly mentions "professional certification" and "continuing education" as important indicators of the competency of
internal auditors. These latter provisions can be interpreted to

22

See Flesher [1991], p. 29.
According to B&H the "skill-subordination" problem had traditionally
blocked internal auditing from gaining exclusive mystique over the internal auditing work ideology. Most members of internal auditing's work audience have
traditionally perceived that CPAs possess high mystique in areas dealing with
internal auditing as well as high mystique over all other areas of auditing. This
skill subordination problem is similar to the problem faced by nurses in the field
of medicine.
24
SAS No. 65, par. 11.
23
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sanction the internal auditing field as a profession separate and
distinct from the field of independent auditing.
SAS No. 65 also c o n t a i n s s o m e n e w provisions t h a t
effectively reinforce critical factors that operate to enhance the
mystique and cruciality of internal auditors. For example, SAS
No. 65 contains new provisions which should discourage top
management and the board from imposing significant restrictions on the audit activities performed by the internal audit
function. In determining independent audit reliance on the work
performed by the auditee's internal audit function, SAS No. 65
mentions that the client's adoption of: IIA Standards; internal
audit charters; audit committees; certification of internal audit
staff members; continuing education for internal auditors; and
high echelon reporting level status would be viewed favorably by
the independent auditor. Many corporate entities can be expected to adopt these measures to appease their independent
auditors. Increased adoption of these items by corporations can
be expected to improve many of the important conditions necessary for the field of internal auditing to gain increased mystique
and cruciality. 25
From the negative standpoint, the provisions of SAS No. 65
impose additional restraints on the independent auditor's reliance on the internal auditor's work in high risk areas (i.e., compared to SAS No. 9). Both Barrett [1990] and Vessel [1991]
believed that management and other members, of the internal
auditing work audience will perceive this decreased willingness
to rely on the internal auditor's work as an indication of internal
auditing's inferior technical capabilities (i.e., as compared to the
independent auditor). If it develops in practice, a perception of
this latter type would further perpetuate the skill-subordination
problem noted by B&H in 1977. This is true even though the
independent auditor's reluctance to rely on the internal auditor's
work in high risk areas may be justified on the grounds that the
internal audit function does not share legal responsibility with
the external auditor for overlapping audit work.
In general, the activities, events, and trends covered in this
section disclose some very favorable professional prospects for
internal auditing. The following section presents some suggested
future courses of action that might be taken by internal auditors
25

For additional analysis of the positive features of SAS No. 65 see: Urton L.
Anderson, "The External Auditor's Consideration of the Internal Audit Function," Internal Auditing, Summer 1991, pp. 59-67.
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to capitalize on these opportunities to gain enhanced mystique
and cruciality.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE
PROFESSIONAL STATUS OF INTERNAL AUDITING
The intimidation model suggests a definite order of development in the two basic conditions that provide the genuine
professions their authority and intimidative power. Development of the conditions which provide the profession enhanced
mystique must first take place in order to provide the evolving
profession a unique subject matter basis for gaining enhanced
cruciality. Therefore, internal auditors should focus their immediate efforts on opportunities that have the greatest potential to
enhance their mystique.
The opportunity to become the predominant experts in the
area of auditing and evaluating traditional accounting-type internal controls appears to be the best alternative for cultivating
enhanced mystique in the current political, legal, and business
environment. The general public, the SEC, the Treadway Commission, legislators, and the organized securities markets all
seem eager to find an occupational group that can apply improved auditing methods to insure that corporate top management meets its fiduciary responsibilities for installing and maintaining a d e q u a t e systems of traditional internal c o n t r o l s .
Internal auditors are in an ideal position to provide this type of
service. CPAs appear to be the only other available group that
might be able render additional assistance in this area. However, CPAs are currently facing intense competitive pressures to
control independent audit time and fees. This pressure impairs
their ability to spend additional audit time examining internal
control issues that do not relate directly to their opinion on the
financial statements. In this competitive environment CPAs can
only provide additional help in the area of traditional internal
control by offering a special attest service. 26 This additional attest service would certainly result in a significant increase in the
annual billings to clients by independent auditors. Since internal auditors are already familiar with corporate controls, they
should be capable of providing this same service at a lower cost
than CPAs.
26

These new attest services are covered by AICPA Statement on Standards
for Attestation Engagements No.2 Reporting on an Entity's Internal Control
Structure over Financial Reporting. (August,1993).
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Internal auditors as a group should begin to re-focus their
efforts on the development and implementation of improved
techniques for evaluating and testing traditional internal controls. This audit area offers internal auditors some excellent
opportunities for cultivating high mystique. One of the best
opportunities deals with the mystical area of risk assessment.
Internal auditors can develop improved techniques for gathering and documenting and sharing internal control risk assessment information. Improved information of this type would provide internal auditors superior bases for developing their
internal control audit test criteria and for defending their internal control audit findings and recommendations. 2 7 Improved information of this type might include the following items: (1)
listings of potential errors, irregularities, and illegal acts that
pose inherent risks to the organization (henceforth referred to
as threats); (2) inherent risk estimates for each threat including
estimates of occurrence rates or likelihoods of occurrence and
estimates of possible error magnitudes or dollar losses; and (3)
estimates of internal control effectiveness levels.
Internal auditors have direct daily access to the world's foremost experts in risk assessment. These experts are the clerical
employees, who perform accounting, operating, and other internal control-related duties in the specific areas where errors,
irregularities, and inefficiencies either originate or first become
susceptible to detection. These employees normally possess the
best available insight pertaining to threats, inherent risk levels,
and control effectiveness related to their work areas. Internal
auditors should develop improved techniques for gathering,
documenting, validating, and sharing this insightful information
possessed by employees.
Internal auditors might pursue projects to develop improved techniques to take better advantage of this information
and knowledge. For example, the IIA might be encouraged to
sponsor ongoing programs to gather risk assessment information from its members in various industries. Information gathered could be used to compile industry data pertaining to such
matters as: (1) the types of errors and irregular and illegal acts
27

This might permit the HA to revise its standards to discourage formal
audit report coverage of management's disagreements with the internal auditor's
findings and recommendations on "traditional internal control audits". It is
doubtful that this coverage can be eliminated for operational auditing concerns
falling outside the scope of "traditional" internal control issues.
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perceived by internal auditors to constitute control threats in
various industries; (2) potential error rates and probabilities of
occurrence assessed by internal auditors for c o m m o n threats in
various industries; and (3) internal audit assessments of potential damages for common threats in various industries. Information of this type could be supplied to practicing internal auditors
in the form of a subscription service which would provide subscribers an improved basis for performing and defending the
reasonableness of risk assessments in their organizations. Improved capabilities to perform inherent and control risk assessments would provide internal auditors a distinct advantage over
independent auditors who do not have time to address threats
and risks at the grass-roots level. Improved risk assessment information of this type would likely increase the mystique of
internal auditing.
Action to take advantage of the opportunity to gain professional status in the area of traditional control auditing will require internal auditors to modify their current thinking reg a r d i n g o p e r a t i o n a l auditing. I n t e r n a l a u d i t o r s c u r r e n t l y
consider operational auditing to be their "premier" professional
service m u c h like public accounting considers independent
auditing to be theirs. Our historical analysis has led us to the
conclusion that this line of thinking on the part of internal
auditors may be faulty.
Operational auditing is not a type of internal auditing service that is susceptible to the cultivation of high mystique and
high cruciality. This is primarily because it involves a nearly undefinable work ideology. The most successful operational auditor is a "jack of all trades" who can provide objective help to
management in dealing with nearly any operational problem.
Unfortunately a "jack of all trades" is typically perceived to be "a
master of none." Mastery over no discipline turns out to be the
antitheses of a profession. From this standpoint "operational
auditing" should probably occupy a position in internal auditing's service line similar to the positions occupied by management advisory services (MAS) and tax advisory services (TAS) in
the field of public accounting. This is not to suggest that internal auditors should abandon or de-emphasize the importance of
operational auditing. What is being suggested is that internal
auditors should begin to cultivate a "professional level of expertise" over the specific area dealing with auditing traditional control concerns. Professional expertise in this limited area would
provide internal auditors intimidative power over a crucial subhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss2/4
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ject area similar to the independent auditing service area that is
the principle source of public accounting's professional status.
This change would not necessarily require any reduction in the
valuable operational auditing services currently being rendered
by internal audit departments. After all, many practicing CPAs
consider MAS and TAS to be their most beneficial and lucrative
service areas. This is true even though CPAs' have not and probably never will enjoy high cruciality in these service areas.
The field of internal auditing can also capitalize on several
other opportunities to enhance its cruciality as the exclusive
provider of traditional control auditing. The current trend for
companies to adopt internal auditing charters is an excellent
example of one of these opportunities. Regulatory groups
requiring or recommending the use of internal auditing charters
could be encouraged to consider charter provisions requiring
the organization to employ a director of internal audit who either possesses a valid CIA credential or is at least a member in
good standing of the IIA. A requirement of this nature would
effectively prohibit management from replacing its professional
director of internal auditing with a non-professional director,
who is not bound to adhere to the profession's standards. Regulations mandating IIA membership and/or the possession of a
CIA c r e d e n t i a l would also significantly i m p r o v e i n t e r n a l
auditing's status under the "shopping list" model. 28
Management responsibility letters also offer internal auditors significant opportunities under both the "intimidation" and
"shopping list" models. To capitalize on these opportunities,
internal auditors should focus their auditing expertise on traditional internal control concerns and lobby for requirements that
the director of internal auditing co-sign the management responsibility letter. A requirement of this type should increase
internal auditing's cruciality under the intimidation model. Furthermore, legal responsibilities associated with signing the management responsibility letter would provide internal auditing a
clear justification for claiming altruistic service to the general
public as well as to management and the organization. This
would improve internal auditing's status under attribute No. l of
the "shopping list" (see Figure 1) by adding the general public to
internal auditing's list of altruistic service beneficiaries.
In the future, increased use of audit committee letters in
annual reports may offer internal auditors opportunities similar
28

See Figure 1, attribute No. 7.
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to those just discussed for management responsibility letters.
Therefore, internal auditors desiring enhanced professional status should seriously consider supporting such a requirement.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examined the progress made toward achieving
professional status by internal auditing. The intimidation model
was employed to assess both the progress made by internal
auditing along with its current status. A review of the literature
did not reveal any evidence of the intimidative power necessary
to qualify for professional status. However, a historical review of
IIA professional pronouncements and the activities of various
authoritative and/or regulatory agencies indicated that there is
considerable support for internal auditing to move up to professional status if the field is willing to take several important
steps.
The single most important step is the need for internal auditors to change their thinking regarding the composition of their
current service line. An improved traditional control auditing
service needs to be developed and implemented to replace "operational auditing" as internal auditing's premier professional
service line. If internal auditing is to gain professional status on
par with that possessed by medicine or law it needs to gain
sufficient intimidative power to force top management into facing up to its internal control responsibilities as defined by the
FCPA of 1977 and the FMAA of 1981. Intimidative power to
force top management to comply with operational audit findings other than those that deal with traditional controls is not
necessary and probably not proper.
Professional authority over the area of traditional control
concerns will not be a comfortable role for many internal auditors. This role will force the auditor to claim expertise and knowhow in the area of traditional controls far superior to that possessed by top management and others.
The Treadway Commission and the SEC are currently looking for a professional group that will take the responsibility for
ensuring that top management of large organizations meets its
internal control responsibilities. It appears obvious that these
groups are not interested in an internal auditor who "thinks like
management." What they are definitely looking for is a group
which possesses the "professional" capabilities to out-think top
m a n a g e m e n t in areas dealing with auditing and evaluating
traditional accounting-type internal control concerns. If internal
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss2/4
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auditors truly desire professional status, perhaps it is time for
them to acknowledge this important message.
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